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NOTES
Secretary of the Interior Wilbur estimates that over 450,000,000
cubic feet of gas are wasted daily in the Kettleman Hills District
in California, although only six out of the thirty wells are pro-
ducing. This waste of energy is twice the estimated future out-
put of the Hoover Dam. 18 In the Cushing, Oklahoma, field more
than 100,000,000,000 cubic feet were wasted during the year
1913-enough to supply the entire city of New York with fuel
for that year. About 30,000 barrels of oil a day were produced
in the field. In other words gas worth $75,000 a day was wasted
to obtain a daily oil production valued at less than $25,000.19
Gas, moreover, contains a considerable quality of the more
volatile petroleum components in vapor form. As many as four
gallons of gasoline have been extracted from 1000 cubic feet of
gas. It has been proven commercially profitable to extract it
where the yield was one-sixteenth that amount. 2 Thus millions
of gallons of gasoline are lost yearly in escaping gas at the same
time that refiners exert every effort to make petroleum yield
more gasoline through the "cracking" process. 21
Obviously, conservation of petroleum, in the sense of a wise
use of natural resources, coupled with maximum efficiency and
minimum physical waste in their production, 22 is highly neces-
sary and should be one aim of all programs for control of the
industry.
HAROLD C. HANKE, '31.
OIL AND GAS LEGISLATION IN OKLAHOMA
Statutes controlling the production of natural gas in Okla-
homa are closely related to those concerning oil, both in form
and administration. There are several reasons for the connec-
tion. Geologists have established the proposition that it is the
gas which is responsible for much of the pressure of the petro-
leum, both being contained in sand or porous rock formations.
Hence waste of gas lowers oil pressure, often causes seepage of
salt water into the oil-bearing strata, and prevents the owner
from bringing all of the crude to the surface. Aside from this
geological relation, there is the fact that they are combined com-
mercially. Although all the Oklahoma statutes on the subject
are contained in a single chapter of the General Laws,' there is
no combination of oil and gas in any one section.
"Wilbur, OIL AND GAS J., Dec. 4, 1930.
" MANNING, YEARBOOK OF THE BUREAU OF MINES (1916) pp. 122-4.
" STOCKING, op. cit. n. 1, pp. 182-3.
"Thirty-nine per cent of the 375,000,000 barrels of gasoline produced in
the United States in 1929 were obtained by "cracking." Jacques C. Murill,
NAT. PETROLEUM NEWS, Dec. 7, 1930, p. 61.
O M. L. Requa, N. Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1929, xi:3:1.
'Comp. Stat. Okla. (1921) c. 68.
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Because of the fugitive nature of the minerals, the ownership
of neither oil nor gas can vest absolutely in the owner of the
surface until taking. The total resources of both are indefinite,
and while their demand is fairly ascertainable and steady, the
supply, although usually in excess, has been very erratic. Hence
the production of both has been made subject to control through
similarly worded proration laws, and the unnecessary waste of
each has been prohibited.
The state's regulation in its present form dates back to 1915.
In that year the well-known Cushing pool was discovered and by
May had reached a peak production of 305,000 barrels of oil a
day.2 A tremendous overproduction was the immediate result
and the waste and proration legislation herein dealt with fol-
lowed. The agency of control over both oil and gas is the state
public utilities board, known in Oklahoma as the Corporation
Commission.
The gas law will be considered first. In 1913 a statute had
been passed prohibiting the taking of more than twenty-five per
cent of the average daily flow of any natural gas well except by
order of the Commission for good cause shown.8 The enact-
ments of 1915 added to this a prohibition against waste,4 which
is defined to include, among other things, the escape of commer-
cial quantities of gas (2,000,000 or more cubic feet per day)."
The proration law was also added, empowering the Commission
to prescribe the proportional amount of gas which each well
owner is allowed to take when the demand is so exceeded by the
supply that the Oil and Gas Department deems action to be
necessary.6 It has not acted thus far.
The only important case involving the gas statutes dealt with
conservation law passed in 1909,/providing that all wells drilled
for natural gas should be shut in until such time as their product
could be used for "lights, fuel or power purposes." Section 7921
' Logan, Stabilization of the Petroleum Industry, Bull. 54, OKLA. GEOL.
SURV. (1930) c. 8.
Comp. Stat. Okla. (1921) sec. 7913.
Ibid., secs. 7920, 7921, 7922.
"... escape of natural gas in commercial quantities into the open air,
the intentional drowning with water of a gas stratum capable of produc-
ing gas in commercial quantities, underground waste, the permitting of any
natural gas well to wastefully burn, and the wasteful utilization of such
gas."
' Other sections protect the strata against infiltrating waters, provide
against flambeau lights, and for inspection of casings, pluggings. Comp.
Stat. Okla. (1921) secs. 7907, 7908, 7924, 7925, 7934. Other regulatory
statutes making pipe-line carriers and all purchasers of oil and gas "com-
mon purchasers" are not considered within the scope of this note, dealing
primarily with conservation legislation.
Comp. Stat. Okla. (1921) sec. 7964.
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(supra) defining waste was also involved. By orders in 1920
and 1922, the Commission, acting under these statutes, prohibited
the Quinton Relief Oil and Gas Co. "from selling any portion of
the gas produced by it from the Quinton field for the purpose of
using the same or allowing the use of the same for the manu-
facture of carbon black."8 On application to the Supreme Court
for a writ of prohibition, it was contended that the statutes of
1915 by necessary implication repealed that of 1909, and that the
latter laws were void for uncertainty and at the same time be-
stowed improper duties upon a commission. The court held,
however, that there was no conflict.9
Authority to determine what constituted "wasteful utiliza-
tion," mentioned in section 7921 (supra) was declared vested in
the Commission in terms sufficiently definite to rebut petitioner's
contention that there was an unconstitutional delegation of
power and that the statutes were void for uncertainty. The
orders were sustained under the statutes of 1915 rather than
under the earlier law, setting up three preferred uses for natural
gas ;1o this no doubt because the Commission was not specifically
mentioned in the latter.11 It was shown that gas used in making
carbon black was worth but a fraction of its value for other pur-
poses, because of the complete waste of heat value.
Yet the decision does not go as far in the interest of conserva-
tion as it might had the constitutionality of the earlier statute
under the Fourteenth Amendment been directly passed upon.
That statute clearly contains more drastic regulation than was
considered in the leading case of Walls v. Midland Carbon Com-
pany12 where only well owners within ten miles of a town or
large industrial plant were included in a prohibition setting up
the comparatively wide field of manufacturing or domestic pur-
pose. The Oklahoma case merely decides that the use of natural
gas to make carbon black was properly prohibited as wasteful
utilization, as was established by the Walls case.
Although the legislature has not gone much farther in the
field of oil regulation than in that of gas, the regulatory activity
of the Commission necessarily has been much greater.13 The
a Order no. 1667 (July 19, 1920) and no. 2039 (Jan. 27, 1922).
Quinton Relief Oil and Gas Co. v. Corporation Com. (1924) 101 Okla.
164, 166, 224 Pac. 156.
" Cf. note, Merrill, Stabilization of the Oil Industry and Due Process of
Law (1929) 3 So. Cal. L. Rev. 401.
" Nor was jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of that act conferred
upon the chief Mine Inspector. Love v. Boyle (1920) 72 Okla. 300, 180
Pac. 705.
(1920) 254 U. S. 300.
"One statute on oil conferring special powers is section 7955, authorizing
the Commission to investigate and ascertain a fair and correct price for
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number of cases which have arisen under the flood of orders
made has been small. Because of this many issues concerning
proration are in doubt, but at the same time the situation re-
flects to the credit of the Commission and indicates that the
producers recognize the advisability of stabilization by the state.
As in the case of gas, the oil statutes prohibit waste1 of any
possible nature, "economic waste, underground waste, surface
waste and waste incident to the production of crude oil or
petroleum in excess of transporting or marketing facilities or
reasonable market demand."1' The oil proration statute, which
is identical with the gas statute, merely sets up the comparison
to be drawn between the output of any common source of sup-
ply and the quantity which can be sold and refined.10 There is
adequate provision for enforcement.17
Under the oil statutes several distinct stages in the exercise
by the Commission of its powers can be observed. The first ef-
fort to restrict production was in connection with the Cushing
pool, already mentioned. When it reached its peak flow in May,
1915, an umpire was appointed to regulate production", and
orders for part-time shutoffs were made, but they did not meet
with the approval of certain producers and the attempt failed
when the district court at Tulsa granted an injunction against
enforcement of the orders. It may safely be said that the in-
junction delayed conservation in Oklahoma for approximately a
decade, since very little action was taken until 1926.
crude and publish its conclusions. This has not been enforced and Veasey
questions its constitutionality. Legislative Control of Producing Oil and
Gas (1927) 52 A.B. A. RFa. 577.4 Comp. Stat. Okla. (1921) sec. 7954.
' Ibid., sec. 7956.
"' Section 7957: "Whenever the full production from any common source
of supply . . . of petroleum can only be obtained under conditions consti-
tuting waste as herein defined," then the owner "may take therefrom only
such proportion of all crude oil that may be produced therefrom without
waste as the production of the well or wells of any one person bears to
the total production of such common source of supply (the field or pool)."
The Corporation Commission is authorized to regulate so as to prevent in-
equitable or unfair taking.
" Any person may have a hearing before the Commission, which has full
and complete powers to compel attendance of witnesses, and cite for con-
tempt of its orders, "analogous to proceedings under its control over public
service corporations as now provided for by law (sec. 7959)." All orders
may be appealed directly to the Supreme Court, but there is no stay pending
appeal (sec. 7960). There may also be a fine (up to $5,000) or imprison-
ment (not to exceed 30 days) (sec. 7961) and a receiver may be appointed
for the violating properties (sec. 7962). Sections 8013 and 8014 empower
a special Oil and Gas department under the Commission, which has all au-
thority over conservation and drilling of wells.
LOGAN, op. cit. c. 8, "Proration."
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In 1921, at the request of producers in the flush Hewitt field,
the Commission found that there was economic waste and made
an order prohibiting the drilling of new wells. 9 Yet the orders
had no marked effect and died a natural death from want of co-
operation among the owners. The Commission intervened for
the third time when voluntary control in the Seminole field failed
in 1926, and 1927 saw no improvement in the overproduction
situation. Matters took their usual course and in May, 1927,
at a meeting of the operators it was decided that the discovery
well was to be allowed unrestricted flow until the first of certain
set-off wells was completed, at which time all wells were to be
"pinched in" to one hundred barrels a day. Not all the oper-
ators signed this voluntary agreement with the result that on
August 9 the first comprehensive proration plan was deemed
necessary by the Commission. It was to run for a period of
sixty days with a head umpire, his scouts and a committee of
five operators in charge of administration of the orders.2 0
The requirements of other later orders were essentially similar
in form but more inclusive in territory and amount of oil shut
in. On September 3, 1928, all the flush fields in the state were
prorated, in reality the first state-wide plan. The action was
based upon a preliminary finding that the general demand from
Oklahoma was approximately 700,000 barrels, from statistics of
refinery capacities, amounts in storage and market reports of
sales. It was also found that from the number of wells then
operating in established fields and the number of wildcat
wells being drilled, production might exceed 900,000 barrels a
day. Hence it was ordered that all new wells be shot only with
written consent of the umpire or Commission. The amounts to
be run were prorated according to three figures, potential pro-
duction of each lease, total potential production of each flush
pool or field, and total potential production of all flush pools.
With these figures ascertained, each flush field was permitted to
produce only such proportion of the total allowable 425,000 bar-
rels allotted to such fields as the potential production of that
field bore to the total potential production of all the flush fields.
OIL & GAs J., Sep. 6, 1928, p. 37.
Their substance follows: (1) Four pools were limited to 450,000 bar-
rels per day. (2) The umpire and scouts ascertained the average daily
flow of all wells in any one pool, which was to be the potential for proration
of each well and collectively of the field. Then, with the daily consumption
estimated, each field and each lease was allowed to take only such per-
centage of its potential as was represented by the estimated demand over
the total potential. (3) New wells were allowed to run three days with
the third day's run as the potential. (4) There was provision for read-justment of potentials and arbitration of disputes by a committee of five
operators.
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The capacity for each lease depended upon the percentage
reached for the field. If a given field could produce ten per
cent of the total potential of all fields, then its quota would be
42,500 barrels a day. Supposing its potential to be 85,000 bar-
rels, then the percentage would be fifty per cent and each lease
could take only that amount of its possible output.
This was the substance of the proration orders of 1928 and
indicates how they were put into effect.21 Overproduction, how-
ever, continued and on January 21, 1930, additional orders were
made leading to important litigation. All wells in the Oklahoma
City field were prorated on a basis of seventy-five per cent with
a sliding clause permitting further curtailment to thirty-three
per cent. When the Commission's orders became even more
drastic and many of the wells in the Oklahoma City field were
allowed to operate only one day in twelve, the Julian Oil and
Royalties Company, owner of several leases, sought a writ of
prohibition against enforcement. 22 Its contentions may be sum-
med up as follows: (1) That the statutes, particularly section
7956, defining waste, are so broad as to confer legislative power
upon the Commission in violation of the Oklahoma Constitution,
(2) that the terms used are too indefinite to confer any powers
upon the Commission, (3) that petitioner's property is taken
without due process of law, equal protection of the laws, or just
cormpensation as guaranteed by the Federal constitution, (4)
that the statutes provide for price control, a matter not subject
to legislative regulation, and (5) that interstate commerce is
interfered with.
In spite of this army of arguments and contrary to previously
expressed opinion,23 the statutes and orders made pursuant to
them were upheld, one judge dissenting. The decision was not
unexpected, however, in view of the Quinton case, and in fact
the plaintiff had dismissed before judgment, the opinions in a
proceeding to determine costs, because of the general public
interest involved.
Taken as a whole, the statutes were held a valid exercise of
implied powers under section nine of the Constitution, concern-
ing public utilities. The classes created were reasonable and
served a proper purpose; hence there was no denial of equal
protection. The original findings of the Commission were re-
viewed with approval and there was little doubt as to the right
of the state to conserve natural resources 24 as well as protect
I Flush fields were those with a daily output in excess of 100,000 barrels.
"C. C. Julian Oil and Royalties Co. v. Capshaw (Okla. 1930) 292
Pac. 842.
VEAsEY, op. cit. 608.
" Relying upon Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana (1899) 177 U. S. 190.
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the co-equal rights of surface owners to common pools. The
petitioner's contention concerning interstate commerce was
based on the effect of penalties against carriers who transported
oil secured in violation of any order of the Commission. It was
held, however, that this was merely a remote and incidental
effect of proration and one not properly raised by the facts.
In a strict legal sense the dissenting judge was right in
arguing that the Commission's orders were in essence for the pur-
pose of maintaining prices and had only incidental concern with
the preservation of resources. 25 Although all the orders made
have been preceded by findings of economic waste, the court sus-
tains the constitutionality of the statutes and the action taken
under them on grounds of conservation only.
There can be no doubt that flooding the market is economically
unprofitable. In 1926 Oklahoma producers received $413,000,-
000 for 179,000,000 barrels of oil, and one year later, with the
general level of prices about the same, they received only
$363,000,000 for 277,000,000 barrels of oil, or $50,000,000 less
for 98,000,000 barrels more oil.25 Much has been done under
the Oklahoma statutes which is of benefit to the industry in
general, although at least temporarily cutting the profits of her
producers.2 7 Observers of the plan have also noticed a possibly
bad result, namely, the failure of prices to follow their customary
relationship to amounts in storage. In 1928 when proration be-
came common a wide and unprecedented divergence began,
prices falling while the amount above ground remained fairly
constant. This phenomenon showed that merely keeping the
crude underground did not produce the usual anxiety about the
future supply, which has so often served to raise the price. Yet
regardless of price, proration does accomplish something in that
costs and evaporation incident to lifting and storage are saved,
or put off until there is a market and they can be met.28
It is generally contended that unit operation of a field is a
more effective regulator than compulsory prorated taking. The
preference is expressed because the former substitutes self-
interest and intelligent cooperation for the policemen of a state
" MERRiLL, op. cit. 401, stating that proration should be held constitutional
only as a preservative of one of the nation's key industries and to guarantee
prosperity to the general public. He admits, however, that there are cer-
tain objects of conservation in the scheme, since a flush field producing to
capacity will always cause a substantial drop in the price of oil, creating a
temptation for the owners of slow-producing wells to abandon them sooner
than usual because not profitably workable.
"On, & GAS J., Aug. 16, 1928, p. 37.
" Only California, Texas, and Oklahoma have enforced proration to any
extent, and the first two in but a very few fields.
0 NAT. PETROL. NEws, Feb. 25, 1931, p. 39.
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commission in the innumerable details involved in administering
a proration plan.2 9 As far as Oklahoma is concerned, however, it
seems certain that present orders will remain in force at least
until there is a diminution of supply or a rising summer demand.
There is working at present a committee appointed by Governor
Murray for the purpose of finding a substitute or effecting a
compromise for those decrying the sacrifices being made by
Oklahoma producers. The Governor himself recently went on
record against proration and also against any immediate repeal
because of the results on the market that might follow such
action.30
The possible element of commercial pressure on state legis-
latures and commissions suggests the greater advisability of
Federal control. One current criticism of state utility commis-
sions is their susceptibility to the demands of the large interests
they are supposed to regulate. It is quite conceivable that under
pressure from petroleum producers a state legislature in an es-
sentially oil-producing state, such as Oklahoma, might adopt or
enforce radical price-fixing legislation which would be unfair to
the consuming public throughout the nation. Extensive powers
given the present Federal Oil Conservation Board, however,
would provide national regulation with all the advantages of uni-
formity, equality, and impartiality as between the producers and
the buyers.
FREDERICK R RODGERS, '31.
THE CALIFORNIA OIL-GAS CONSERVATION ACTS
The state of California, because of its great supply of petro-
leum and because of its position on the Pacific coast, far away
from the other great petroleum fields, holds an important place
in the petroleum industry of the United States. The legislation
of California prior to 1929 was twofold in its purpose. It sought
to prevent the infiltration of water into the oil-bearing strata by
appropriate regulations, compliance with which was made man-
datory on gas and oil-well operators. It sought also to prevent
the needless direct waste of natural gas through allowing it to
escape from open wells.1
The State Oil and Gas Supervisor was directed to make tests
for the determination of the most efficient methods by which
underground oil and gas deposits might be kept free from the
infiltration of water and to order such measures to be taken by
well operators. If a well operator refused to make the repairs
' Unit Operation and Proration Differ, OiL & GAS J., Nov. 15, 1928, p. 39.
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 12, 1931.1 Gen. Laws Cal. (Deering, 1923) Act 4916.
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